DOT Traffic Management Centers Cyber Security Assessment Methodology

John Contestabile Israel Anthony Lopez December 2023



Need to assess Cyber at DOT's

- While IT security for the enterprise has developed as the threat has emerged/evolved, the OT security environment has not kept pace.
- In the past, the OT network of field devices was on a separate network....not so anymore
- The OT network[s] are typically operated by the maintenance/operations part of the DOT whereas the enterprise network is operated by the CIO/IT part of the organization.
- The IT staff, while having responsibility for cyber security, may not have the expertise to deal with OT networks which are typically a collection of fiber/wireless/cellular service providers and endpoint equipment which is not familiar



TRAFFIC NETWORKS

- Operational Technology
- Networks with field devices serving business functions
- Low rate of change
- Limited Internet Access





• Need controlled means for exchanging digital data

Partners Jurisdictions Media Public Safety

Internet Public

Skyline utilizes the National Institutes of Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) v 1.1 as the guiding framework for conducting the assessments. The assessment incorporated several other source documents in developing an IT and OT questionnaire for the initial evaluation. Those sources include:

- The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Project 03-127 "Cybersecurity of Traffic Management Systems"
- NIST Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 5 (Special Publication (SP) 800-53r5)
- The Federal Highway Administration's Technical Report on "Transportation Management Center IT Security"

Methodology – NIST CSF





See: Cybersecurity Framework | NIST

Methodology – DHS CISA

<u>Department of Homeland Security – Cyber Infrastructure Security Agency</u> [DHS-CISA] – March 2023 update

"CISA's Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) are a subset of cybersecurity practices, selected through a thorough process of industry, government, and expert consultation, aimed at meaningfully reducing risks to both critical infrastructure operations and the American people. These voluntary CPGs strive to help small- and medium-sized organizations kickstart their cybersecurity efforts by prioritizing investment in a limited number of essential actions with high-impact security outcomes."



See: <u>Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals | CISA</u>

TECHNOLOGY SOLUTION

Skyline DOT TMC Cyber Assessment Approach



7

Results in the identification of various issues and findings for both IT and OT systems as well as recommendations.

| Key IT Issues - Executive Summary – A Systemwide Perspective | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| Threat | NIST CSF Domain | Vulnerability | Asset | Impact | Likelihood | Risk | Control Recommendations and Assessment | |
| 1. Lack of | Identify | High | Critical | Critical | High | High | Critical | |
| Lifecycle | The ability to identify | Inadequate life cycle | All - This applies | All devices and | The likelihood that | Potential loss from | Lifecycle management should | |
| Management. | is reduced due to the | planning for IT | to devices, | services (ATMS, FMS, | the TMC does not | \$10,000 to | involve developing a plan to | |
| | lack of life cycle | operations and | software, and | ATIS, and others) | have a fully vetted | \$10,000,000 | identify replacement needs, | |
| | management | cybersecurity. | infrastructure. | may be affected for | replacement lifecycle | | plan for replacement, and to | |
| | planning for devices | | | an unknown period. | plan which will affect | | budget the replacement of | |
| | and software. | | | | recovery is high. | | equipment, hardware, | |
| | | | | | | | software, and licensing. | |

Example of an IT Issues/Executive Summary



| Key OT Issues - Executive Summary – A Systemwide Perspective | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| Threat | NIST CSF Domain | Vulnerability | Asset | Impact | Likelihood | Risk | Control Recommendations and Assessment | |
| 1. Lack of | Detect | High | Critical | Critical | High | High | Critical | |
| Vulnerability | The ability to Detect | Inadequate vulnerability | All - This applies | All services (ATMS, | The likelihood that | Potential loss from | Configure a vulnerability | |
| Management. | is limited due to the | management. | to devices, | FMS, ATIS, field | most vulnerabilities | \$10,000 to | scanner to scan a test | |
| | lack of vulnerability | | software, and | network, and other | are not tracked is | \$10,000,000 | environment to confirm | |
| | management for | | infrastructure. | services) may be | high. | | settings that incorporates | |
| | devices and | | | affected for an | | | device types sensitive to | |
| | software. | | | unknown period. | | | scanning and test the various | |
| | | | | | | | firmware versions. Begin | |
| | | | | | | | scanning the network for | |
| | | | | | | | vulnerabilities. | |

Example of an OT Issues/Executive Summary



The Questionnaire was followed by an in-person field visit to review the answers and observe equipment installations/configurations.

The assessment yields a rating that identified areas of concern warranting a greater focus.

| Table 1 – I | Γ and OT | Results | Table |
|--------------------|----------|---------|-------|
|--------------------|----------|---------|-------|

| Environment Area | Rating | lssues | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
|------------------|--------|--------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| IT | 58% | 39 | 7 | 11 | 14 | 7 |
| ОТ | 56% | 33 | 12 | 7 | 6 | 8 |

Example of the IT/OT Results



11 Typical Transportation Themes across both IT/OT

- 1. IT and OT Boundary Standard
- 2. Security Hygiene
- 3. Network Documentation
- 4. Network Services Architecture
- 5. Identity Management, Passwords, and MFA
- 6. Log Management, SIEM, and Time Servers
- 7. Governance: Policies and Procedures
- 8. Asset Inventory and Management
- 9. Personnel Training
- 10. Vulnerability Management
- 11. Email Security



Looking Ahead

Practice due care and diligence in building **a layered defense** focused on a people-process-and technology driven program with the right governance, services and tools.

- Examine the **People** issues....Adequate staffing? Sufficient training of employees and key staff? Use of consultants?
- Examine the **Process** issues....Adequate process and procedures? Well documented? Good communications?
- Examine the **Tech** issues....Adequate tools for monitoring? Integrated dashboard that give near real time status?

The above will likely take **Funding**....Is there a cyber program that has budgetary standing and projections over time for staffing/training/tech refresh and new tools?



Cyber Maturity Cyber Resiliency

| Cybersecuri | Culture supports continuous | | | | |
|--------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | Increased resources and awareness, clearly defined roles | improvements to security skills, process, and |
| | | Infosec leadership | Some roles and responsibilities | and responsibilities | Process more comprehensively implemented, risk based, and guantitively |
| | | established, | established | Formal infosec | |
| Decule > | Activities | communication | Organization wide | committees, verification, and | |
| | understaffed or uncoordinated No formal security | Basic governance and risk | processes and policies in place but minimal verification | measurement processes Control monitored, measured for | understood |
| | | management | | | Controls more comprehensively |
| | program in place | Some controls in | More controls | | implemented |
| Technology → | Despite security issues, no controls exist | development with limited documentation | developed, but over- reliant on individual efforts | compliance, but uneven levels of automation | subject to continuous improvement |
| | Initial 1.0 | Developing 2.0 | Defined 3.0 | Managed 4.0 | Optimized 5.0 |

S

13

IT/OT Works Together with Cybersecurity Operations

IT/OT Operations:

- Conduct disaster recovery and testing
- Follow compliance / governance policies
- Install and configure apps
- Manage computers, servers, and other devices
- Maintain hardware inventory
- Monitor and troubleshoot systems
- Perform backups
- Plan and implement technology upgrades
- Provide technical support



Both Work Together To: Defend Endpoints, Migrate Systems, Manage Systems, and Sustain Digital Operations

Cybersecurity Operations:

- Conduct risk audits and vulnerability assessments
- Ensure compliance with industry regulations
- Hunt for and identify potential threats
- Implement security policies
- Manage identity and access controls systems
- Mitigate threats and malicious activities
- Perform cyber defense testing
- Perform penetration testing



Thank You



